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THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN KANSAS.
of the articles which have heretofore appeared in print
M OST.
in reference to the new Court of Industrial Relations in Kansas have beet, taken up with such. matters as the _nationality of Alexander Howat;· president of the Kansas district of the United Mine
\Yorkers, the cost and frequency of strikes among l11iners, the ideals
of Governor Henry J. Allen and others responsible for the creation
of the new Court and the like. But little has found its way -into
print in the way of an exact analysis of the jurisqiction, powers and
methods of procedure of this'tribunal. Such an analysis is attempted
in this article.
.

ORIGIN· OF COURT

.

On November I, I9I9, a nation wide strike of coal miners in the
bituminous coal fields began. Very soon thereafter in. Kansas, the
state. through a receivership ordered by the Supreme COurt, took
charge of the mines and attempted to operate them, with the assistance of a large force of volunt~ers, while National Guardsmen pre.served order in the small district affected. The next step was a
proclamation by the Governor on December 8, 1919, calling an extra
session o( the Legislature t9 convene on January 5, 1920, for' the
purpose of giving consideration to industrial relations. With but
very slight delay, the Legislature at this spetial session. enacted the
measure creating the Court of Industrial Relations, which became a
part of the·Kansas statute law on January 24, 1920.
PROVISIONS OF STATUTE

The act creatin~ th~ Court of Industrial Relations is quite brief,
covering but eleven small pages in large type.
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The first section creates the Court of Industrial Relations, to be
composed of three judges to be_ appointed by the Governor, with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The salary of each is fixed at
$5,000 the normal term of office at three years, one judge to retire
each year.
The second section confers upon-the new Court all the powers of
the old Public Utilities Commission, which is abolished. It may be
added, however, that, at the regular session .of the Legislature in
1921, these two bodies were divorced and the Public Utilities Com-·
mission re-created.
The third section of the original act declares the following industries to be affected with a public interest and subject to the supervision by the state, namely : The production, in any stage of the
process, of food products, or wearing apparel ; the production of
fuel for domestic, manufacturing or transportation purposes ; the
transportation of any of the aforesaid articles; all public utilities
and common carriers; together with all persons and corporations
engaged in such industries. The next section' gives the Court "full
power, authority and jurisdiction to supervise, direct and control the
operation" of the industries enumerated.
The fifth section gives the Court full power to
"adopt all reasonable and proper rules and regulations to
govern· its proceedings, the service of process, to administer.
oaths, and to regulate the mode and manner of all its investigatiOns, inspections and hearings: Provided, however, That
in the taking of testimony the !tiles of evidence, as recognized
by the supreme court of the state of Kansas in original proceedings therein, shall be observed by Silid Court of Indu~l
Relations."
The sixth section declares it
"to be necessary for the public peace, health, and general welfare of the people of this state that the i~dustries, employments, public utilities and common carriers herein specified
shall be operated with reasonable continuity and efficiency in
order that the people of. this state may live in peace and security, and be supplied with the necessaries of life. No person, firm, corporation, or ~ssociation of persons .shall in anr
manner or to any extent, wilfully hinder, delay, limit or sus-
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pend such continuous and efficient operation for the purpose
of evading the purpose and intent of the provisions of this
act; nor shall any person, firm,. corporation, or association of
persons do aiiy act or neglect or refuse to perform any duty
herein enjoined with the intent to hinder, delay, limit or suspend such continuous and efficient operation as aforesaid,
except under the terms and conditions provided by this act."
The seventh section provides that,
"if it shall appear to said: Court of Industrial Relations that
said controversy may endanger the continuity or efficiency of
service of any of said industries, employments, public utilities
or common carriers, or affect th.e production of transportation of the necessaries of life affected or produced by said
industries or employments, or produce industrial ·strife disorder or waste, or endanger the orderly operation of such
industries, employments, public utilities or common carriers,
and thereby endanger the public peace or threaten the public
health, full pow~r, authority and jurisdiction are heret>y
granted to said Court of Industrial Relations, upon its own
initiative, to summon all necessary parties before it and to investigate said controversy, and to make such te~porary findings and orders as may be necessary to preserve the public
peace and welfare and to preserve and protect the status of
the parties, property and public interests involved pendin~
said inves~igations, and to take evidence and to exan;iine all
necessary records, and to investigate conditions surrounding
the workers, and to consider the wages paid to labor and the
return accruing to capital, and the rights and welfare of the
public, and all other matters affecting the conduct of said industri!?&, employments~ public utilities or commor carriers,
and to settle and adjust all such controversies by such findings and orders as provided in this act."
In such cases, proceedings may also be instituted b: ten citizen
taxpayers in the community affected, or upon complair .t by the Attoiney-Gene.ral.
Section eight reads :
"The Court of Industrial Relations. shall order such
changes. : r :my, as are necessary to be made in and about the
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conduct of said industry, employment, utility or common carrier, in the matters of working and living conditions, hours of
labor, rules aild ·practices, and a reasonable minimum wage,
or standard of wages, to conform to the findings of the court
in such matters, as provided in this act, and suclt orders shall
be sei:ved at the same time and in the same manner as provided for the service of the court's findings in this act: Provided, all such terms, conditions and wages shall be just and
reasonable and such as to enable such industries, employments, utilities or ~ommon carriers to continue with reasonable efficiency to produc~ or transport their products or continue· their operations and thus to promote the general welfare."
Orders in this connection when made by the Court, "shall continue for such reasonable time as may be fixed -by said Court, or
until changed by agreement of the parties with the approval of the
Court." After sixty days, either party may apply to the Court for
the modification of such orders.
Section nine must be reproduced in full.
"It is hereby declared necessary for the promotion of the
general welfare that workers engaged in any of said industries, employments, utilities or common carriers shall receive
at all times a fair wage and have healthful and moral surroundings while engaged in such labor; and that capital invested therein shall receive at all times a fair rate of return
to the owners thereof. The right of every person to make
his own choice of employment and to make and carry out fair,
just and reasonable contracts and agreements of employment,
is hereby recognized. 'If, during the continuance of any such
employment, the terms or conditions of any. such contract or
agreement hereafter entered into, are by sa!d court, in any
action or proceeding properly before it under the provisions
of this ~ct, found to be unfair, unjust or unreasonable, said
Court of Industrial Relations may by proper order so modify
the terms and conditions thereof so that they will be and remain fair, just and reasona:ble and all such orders shall be
· enforced as in this act provided."
·
Section ten makes provision for se~ic~ of notices of proceedings ;
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section eleven for the employment of experts and other employees ;
section twelve provides a review of the Court's orders by the State
Supreme Couri; section thirteen provides for interference by the
ordinary Courts with the orders of the Industrial Court only within
thirty days from the time of the seryice of such orders.
Section fourteen allows both incorporated and unincorporated
unions or associations of workers to appear before the C~:mrt as
"legal entities." If unincorporated, such association may appoint one·
of its officers as its agent or trustee, "with atithorit}r to enter into
such colJective bargains and to represent each and every of said individuals in all matters relating thereto."
Section ~£teen makes it unlawful to discriminate agai~st any person who invokes the aid of the Court, or who assists the Court in
settling any controversy, while section s,ixteen, in brief, m~es
"lock-outs,'' or shut-downs ·for the purpose of curtailing production
and boosting prices unlawful, though meritorious applications for
limiting or ·ceasing operations may be granted by the Court.
·
Section seventeen makes it unlawful to fail or refuse to perform
any act or duty enjoined by the act, and, while recognizing the right
Qf 3.!1 individual workman to quit his employment, makes it "unlawful for any such individual * * * to conspire with other persons," to strike, or for any individual to engage in "picketing."
Section eighteen provides punishment by a fine not to exceed
$1,000, or by imprisonment not to exceed one year in the county
jail, or both, for the ordinary. mortal, while section nineteen :raises
the maximum: to $5,00<? fine and two years ·in the penitentiary for an
officer of a corporation or labor union or association, upon. conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of a willful violation of
the "act.
Section twenty allows the Court to take over and operate any
essential industry when necessary for the public welfare, w\lile section twenty-one allows labOr controversi~s even in non-~ssential industries to be referred for settlement to the Court. Section twentytwo makes provision for commissioners to take testimony. Section
twenty-four makes orders for wage increases ot reductions retroactive to the commencement of. the proceeding~. Section twentyfour allows the Court, with the consent of the Governor, to make
investigations within the state or elsewhere into industrial problerµs.
The other provisions of the act are not o.f importance for our pur-
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pose, with the _possible exception of the provision in section twentyseven, whiGh casts all exp~nses incident to the operation of the Court,
not on the parties litigant, but upon legislative app,ropriations.
GOVERNOR AU.EN'S PLAN

In his message to the special session of the legislature, Governor
Allen· stated :
"It seems to me that legislation is imperatively needed and
should .be immediately enacted:" 1. Declaring the operation of the -great industries affecting food, clothing, fuel and transportation to be impressed ·
with a public interest and s~bject to reasonable regulation by
the state.

"2. Creating a strong, dignified tribunal, vested with
power, authority and jurisdiction to he!lr and determine all
controversies which may arise and which threaten to hinder,
delay or suspend the operation 'of such industries.

"3. Declaring it to be the duty of all persons, firms, corporations and associations of persons engaged in such industries to operatt" th~ same· witl reasonable continuity, in order
that the people of this state rr. ay be supplied at all times with
the necessaries of life.
"4. ·Providing that in -case of controversy arising between
employers and employees o.r betwee11 different groups or
crafts of workers which may threaten the.'continuity or efficiency of such industries and thus the production or transportation of the necessaries of life, or which may produce an
industrial strife or endanger the peaceful operation of such
industries, jt shall
the duty of said tribunal, on. its own
initiative or on the complaint of either party, or on the complaint of the attorney-general, or on complaint of citizens, to
inv.estigate ;md det~rmine the controversy and to make ·an
order pres.cribing rule$ and regulations, hottrs of labor, working conditions, and a reasbnable minimum wage, which shall
thereafter be observed in the conduct of said industry unttl
such time as the parties inay agree

be

"5. J,>rovidipg for·the incorpo{ation of unions or associa-
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tions of workers, recognizing the right of collective bargaining and giving full faith and credit to any and all contracts
made in pursuance of said right.
"6. Providing for a speedy determination of the validity
of any such order made by said tribunal in the supreme court
of this state without th.e delay which so often hampers 'the
administration of justice in ordinary cases.
"7. Declaring it unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association of persons to delay or suspend the production or transportation of the necessaries of life, except upon
application to and order of said tribunal.
"8. D~claring it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to discharge or discriminate against any employee
because of the participation of such employee in any proceedings before said tribunal.
"9. Making it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation engaged in said lines of industries to cease operations for
the purpose of limiting production, to affect prices or to avoid
any of the -provisions of this act, but also providing a means
by which proper rules and regulations may he- formula,tcd by
said tribunal providing for the operation of such industries as may be affected by changes in season, market conditions,
or other reasons or ·causes inherent in -the nature of. the.business.
"10. Declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation or for any association of persons to violate any
of the provisions of this act, or to conspire or confederate
with others to violate any provisions of this act, or to intimidate any person, firm or corporation engaged in such industries with the intent to hinder, delay or suspend the operation
of such industries and thus to hindet, delay, or suspend the
production or transportation of the necessaries of life.
"1 r. Providing penalties by fine or imprisonment, or both,
for persons, firms, or corporations or associations of persons
willfully violating the provisions of this act.
"12. Making provisions whereby any increase- ot wages
granted to labor by said tribunal shall take effect as of the
date of the beginning of the investigation.
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"By means of such legislation I believe we will be able :" 1. To make strikes, lockouts, boycotts and blacklists unnecessary and impossible, by giving la~or as well as capital
an able and just tribunal in which to litigate all controversies.
"2. To insure ·to the people of this state, at all times, an
adequate supply of those products. which are absolutely necessary to the su~taining of the life of civilized peoples.
"3. That by stabilizing production of these ne.cessaries we
will also,.to a great extent, stabilize the price to the producer
as well ·as the consumer.
"4. That we will insure to labor steadier employment, at a
fairer wage, under better wm·king conditions.
- "5. That we will prevent the colossal eeonomic waste
which always attends industrial disturbances.
"6. That we will make the law respected, and discourage
and ultimately abolish intimidation and violence as a means
for the settlement of indus~rial disputes."

EFFECT OF ACT

One of the first questions which occurs to the lawyer,-. upon examining the Act, naturai~y ~s, Is it constitutional? This has not yet
been determined, except as to a few mii:ior details which were upheld
by t~e Kci.nsas Supreme Court. The decision in State v. H owat1 by
no means determines the constitutionality of those portions of the
act which are most significant. The court expressly declares, "It
would be utterly futile in a proceeding, the sole purpose of which is
to ·require obedience to a subpoena, to undertake to determine in
detail the effect and validity of the various provisions of the statu.te
attacked." It would be equally futile and inadvisable iii. the present
article· to attempt to forecast the ultimate de<!ision on these questions which must certainly be passed upon, eventually, by the United
States Supreme Court. At all events, if the act is constitutional in
its entirety, it means that in the industries enumerated, at least, the
Court may be empowered to fix the hours of labor, minimum wage
even for adult males and set at naught any confracts1made between
employer and employee 01J. such matters, when, in ~he estimation of
the Court, such contracts· become unfair, unjust or unreasonable,
• IO'/ Kansas, 423.
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and this the Court may do, either of its own motion upon the complaint of the Attorney-General, or even of ten citizen taxpayers in
the community in which the industry is located. Moreover, in such
industries, strikes, lockouts and picketing may ·be made criminal.
This appears to be the first' attempt of any· State to fix a minimum·
wage for adult males. 2
•
Is the measure progressive or reactionary? At first glance, the
answer appear.s to be that it is both. In so far as it attempts ·to regulate working conditions, hours of labor and wages by the will of. a
tribunal instead of leaving· the matter to the will of the employer, or
to be fought over by employer and ~mployee, the.act may be classed
·as progressive, in the sense that it is in line with similar measures in
Australia, New Zealand and other communities considered "advanced';. But in so far as the act makes. striking a crime, it J:!lay be
suggested that we are taken back at least to the English Combinations Act of 18oo, ·which made striking a crime·and also attempted,
like the Kansas Act, to protect the workmen from concerted action
by employers and provided for the arQitraticm of disputes between
"masters aiid workmen".3 The fundamental notion of a settlement
of labor disputes by an impartial tribunal can hardly be deemed new
or novel. "Statutory provision for the settlement of labor disputes
by regular tribunals with power to enfoi:ce their awards has existed
ever since the middle of the Fourteenth century".' In other words,
before Columbus discovered America, the essential element in the
Kansas Act had come to light. Moreover, in the course of the nineteenth century, the right of workmen to strike, at least for the purpose of obtaining.a definite increase in wages, seemed to have become
established in practically _every state in the Union, as well as in England. Hence, the Kansas Act appears to be a move in two opposite
directions. But why are strikes m~de. criminal,. and why are the men ·
compelled to submit to adjudication? Because of the public interest
at stake. It is in the frank recognition of the paramount importance
of what Governor Allen has referred to as the submerged nine-tenths
of society that the act parts company with earlier measui:es which
sought to bring master and workman together by squeezing still
8o8.
III, chapter 1o6.

• 10 MoNTHLY LABOR Rtmw
• STAT.

40

GEORGE

• PALGRAVE, D1cTIONARY OF PoLITICA~ EcoNOMY,

V_oL 3, page~~·
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more the great bulk of society looked upon as outsiders~ though
really the men who "paid the freight."
· One phase of the new Act has caused much discussion, but need
be merely noted in passing. Should the members of the Industrial
Court be appointed by the Governor, or elected by the people? This
question is much the same as that in reference to the election or
appointment of the members of courts of general jurisdiction, heads
of governmental departments and the like and its discussion in this
article would take us too fai adrift.
It is insisted by Governor Allen that the new Court is not a court
of arbitr~tion, but a <:ourt of justice. 5 So also, Professor William
R. Vance makes this distinction : "It will be noted that the function
of arbitration is to arrive at a compromise, supported so far as possible by considerations of justice and reason, which dangerous autagonists can be induced to accept in preference to the losses and uncertainties of open conflict, while adjudicati~n consists in the determination by an impartial tribunal of issues presented in accordance
with' established rules .. A compromise award is a partial defeat for
both of the contestants, and satisfies neither. In fact, it is apt to be
~etermined according to the existing strength of the contestants,
while an adjudication is supposed to proceeed upon certain fixed
principles that take no account of the relative strength of the parties.
The contestant who refuses to abide by the award of ci.rbitrators
merely breaks his contract and sets l!is judgment against that of the
arbitrators, while the party who refuses to submit to a judgment of
a Court is defying the state.'' 8
If arbitration at its best is what Professor Vance says of it, no one
would wish to use it in the settlement of industrial disputes. If it
means that two dangerous antagonists are to confront each other
before three men who will be controlled in making their decision by
the strength of the antagonists, without regard to fixed principles,
and· that, after all the expense incident to the hearing of evidence,
and possibly the resort to various tests to determine the relative
strength of the combatants, a compromise award which satisfies nobody is arrived at, the case of arbitration is indeed a sad one. B~t
is. the difference between arbitration and· adjudication so great
as this?
'RtvJEw OF 'Rtvmws, Vol. 61, page 597.
• YAL£ LAW Jor;aNAL, Volume 30, page 468.
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"Arbitration at common Jaw was but a judicial investigation out
ot court." 7 "An arbitration is a judicial proceeding, and the arbitrators are bound to exercise a high degree of judicial impartiality."8
It is s~bmi~ted that the one important distinction between ar~itra
tion and adjudication lies in the f~ct that arbitrator.. are generally
select~d by the parties themselves, aside from the odd member
chosen by the other arbitrators, while judges are generally selected
in some other manner. But even this distinction is open to question, when i_t is recalled that the judges in· our ordinary courts are
sometimes selected by the litigants themselves. 9 As to arbiti:ation's
resulting in a compromise, unsatisfactory to either side. does not
the same thing happen every day in lawsuits? And is ·there anything .
-to prevent arbitrators from deciding wholly for one side or the other?
As to the difference between an award and an adjudication it has
been suggested that a contestant who refuses to abide by an award
merely breaks a contract, while disobedience to a judgment is a
defiance of the state. This proposition also is of limited, rather than
universal application. In many jurisdictions, by statute, an award df
arbitrators is given the force of a verdict of a jury and judgment
may be entered upon it, without the necessity of suit. 10 Moreover,
in many instances, the court of equity will enforce an .award of
arbitrators by a decree of specific performance, supported by the
ustial penalties. 11 On the other hand, the defiance of the state in the
case .of failure to comolv with many a judgment, as foi: example, a
simple money judgment, is but slight.
Has an adjudication the advantage of arbitration in that the latter
is apt te tum on the strength of the contestants? If we dismiss from
our- consideration the kind of might which results from right, and
look upo_n .strength and might as ·matters of mere force, it is hardly
necessary to point out that an adjudication based upon the strength
of the parties is an. unadulterated miscarriage of justice, as for
example, when the jury's verdict is rendered through fear of a mob
• People v. Board of Supervisors, 15 N. Y. Supp. 750.
'Produce Co. v. Norwich Fire Ins. Co., 91 Minn. 212.
•See Alabama & F. R. Co. v. Burket, 42 Ala. 83; Henderson v. Pope, 39
Ga. 361; Salter v. Salter, 69 Ky. 624; Castles. v. Burney, 34 Tex. 470.
11
See Anderson · v. Beebe, 22 Kansas 768; Morville v. American Tract
Society, 123 Mass: 129; Willesford v. Watson, L. R. 8 Ch. 473.
uGuild v. Santa Fe R Co., 57 Kan. 70; Jones v. Boston Mill Co., 4 Pick.
(Mass.) 507.
·
·
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known to be right outside of the court house. But is not the same
thing equally true in the case o'f arbitration? Arbitration which
admittedly takes into account the strength of the contestants would
be but a mockery of justice, merely a form of legalized tyranny.
The last point in reference to the distinctic;m between arbitration
and adjudication is perhaps of greatest significance, namely, that an
adjudication is based on fi~ed princi_ples or established rules. It is
undoubtedly the case that where arbitration boards are merely
ephemeral, their tindings will have no more element of permanency
or precedent than verdicts of juries. But whenever a permanent
board, shop conunittee, impartial chairman or other tribunal becomes
established in any field, it is submitted that precedents which will be
followed and rules which will be acquiesced in, must in the very
nature of things arise. Hence, it is not surprising but is rawer a:
matter of course that, with the increase in the number of settlement
of disputes between employers and employees by various petty tribunals, a syste.n of industrial jurisprudence is developing. It may
take a long time for the various theories of wages and distribution
of wealth to crystallize into a definite body of rules, but such a
system is now in process of development and it will not be long before some enterprising publishing house or philanthropic or governmental agency will see the necessity of collecting, indexing and digesting this material.1 2 However, for the present, it must be admitted
~hat the Kansas Court will not have a great deal in the way of thoroughly settled rules to guide it in its manifold fields. After centuries
of accumulation of common law precedents, it is still an every day
occurrence to find no precedent which. will exactly fit a case before
us. Moreover, we can hardly hope for the development of an industrial jurisprudence without interference and modification, from time
to time, by legislative enactments. For example, if it is finally decided that it is constitutional for the Kansas Industrial Court to fix
the minimum wage of day laborers at, say, a dollar and a half a day,
what is to prevent the State legislature at _its next session from
raising it to two dollars? Let us but recall the "two cents a mile"
statutes in spite of the creation of public utilities· commissions to
attend to this very matter.
· A signi_ficant provision, in this connection, has already been noted
12

See "The ·Development of Industrial Justice," by Morris L. Ernst,
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in the Act in section five, which limits the court in the taking of
testimony to the rules Qf evidence recognized by the Supreme Court.
Is such a limitation necessary or desirable? Moreover, can we arrive
at the foundation sto~es of industrial justice within the confines of
the rules of Greenleaf and Wigmore? If the answer be in the negative, we are equally perpiexed if we attempt to suggest any alternative restrictions, or try to imagine the consequences of throwing
aside all limitations upon the letting in of testimony, thus giving a
day, or perhaps many days in court, to every personage who evolves
a new theory or doctrine of wages, or "philosophy" in reference to
the rights and duties of master and workman.
The need for an impartial tribunal representing the publi.c rather
than the contestants, as in the case of arbitrators, varies somewhat
with th<> character of the essential industry covered by the Act. In
the case of a natural monopoly, a.S for example, the street car lines
of a particular city, it is obvious that a fight between employers and
employees may result in a victory for both by a boost in both car
fares and wages. But .this is not true in the case of such an industry
as flour milling in Topeka. Here, the competition of interstate commerce prevents the raising of the price of the product to any great
extent. Hence, the one important question of distribution is: how
much of the market price of the flour shall go to the employer, and
how much to the employee? The public need not worry so long as
it can get its flour in Missouri. The Court cannot fix the price. But
in the case of a nation wide tie-up, such as the coal strike, this alternative is of little value.
Of how great significance is this new Kansas law? On the one
hand, it may be contended that it is not a violent departure from
established modes of operating, that the new Court is but one logical
step after the creation of public utilities commissions and the use of
voluntary arbitratio~. Moreover, the new Act does not destroy
competition. Men may still quit singly or in groups provided the
quitting does not amount to striking. While possibly three-fourths
of all Kansas industries fall within the territory of the essential,
there is still room for strikes and lockouts in the ·other fourth and
jobs may be obtained even in the essential industries a step over the
state line. Many persons, especially trades unionists, insist that no
law can stop strikes. We may hot>e they are wrong, but whether
or not this Act can do it effectively, nothing but time and experiment
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will prove. Moreover, it is urged that Kansas is no better place
for testing industrial innovations than Chicago would be for trying
out a new mountain-climbing apparatus. In but a small spot in the
southeast, and there only in the coal fields, do we find in Kansas
highly organized and belligerent trade unions. Elsewhere and in
other industries, trade unionism has no stronghold. The average.
farmer has but one or two farm hands, or none at'all, and these
spend but little time in organizing unions, and are much more likely
to be treated as members of their master's family. The migratory
field hands who follow the wheat as it ripens from Texas to Hudson
Bay are too sporadic to be effective strikers. Possibly not until industrial courts are established in all states will the full force of the
Kansas idea be felt. It is doubtless as true today as when it was
written, that "Whatever is best administered is best." If so, the
success or failure of the Kansas law will depend not entirely, or so
much upon the theories or principles underlying it, as it will upon the
inctustry, character and tactfulness of the judges and their ability to
placate the opposing forces.
To those who regard the new Act as revolutionary, it is a kind of
Magna Charta extorted from the industrial barons and labor czars
by the other nine-tenths of society and settles for all time the paramount right of society over industry. In the estimation of many of
'its labor opponents, the killing or throttling of strikes sounds the
death knell of labor's most effective weapon, without which the
progress of working people is stopped, while to others who condemn
strikes, it cuts from the neck of the laborer a mill stone which has
frequently kept him submerged in pauperism and crime, to say nothing of the lash of the labor leader. While organized labor is not
extensiv_e in Kansas, it may be contended that the small Kansas area
wherein the miners are h!ghly organized is ideal in its proportions
for such an experiment, and though the nme is not yet ripe to predict
the outcome in Kansas, it is interesting to note that, while most of
the opposition to the establishment of the Court probably came from
organized labor, rather than capital,13 it is labor and not capital which
seems to be making the far greater· number of appeals to the Court
for the settlement of labor disputes. Moreover, the tendency on the
part of employees to organize seems to have been stimulated by the
"Wm. M. Duffus, AMERICAN

EcoNO~Ic Rr:v1Ew,

June, r920, page ·411.
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new Act, by reason of the frank recognition which it gives to such
organizations.
According to one authority, such an act will lead to the growth of
extra-judicial bodies, "From the time that the legislature allowed
the conditions of serviee to become a matter of free contract, neither
employers nor workmen have ever been induced to make use of° the
judicial machinery provided for them, but they have always preferred to form voluntary tribunals of their own."u. Clearly, there is
nothing in the new. Kansas Act which prevents the organization of
shop committees or resorts to voluntary arbitration. Moreover, if
the Kansas Act results in the adj"ustment of labor disputes by such
voluntary methods, it will have been a success far beyond the expectations of many of its most ardent advocates, to say nothing of
the relief to the taxpayers who now must needs pay the bills of the
Kansas Industrial Court.
In conclusion, it may be said that if, to any high degree, the new
Court is a success, it means that Kansas has evolved a solution of a
problem which has vexed society, if not from the time when Adam
began to delve for himself, at foast from the day when one man
worked for another. If Governor Allen's industnal code pu~ an
end to the conflict between capital and labor, he deserves to rank
higher as a lawgiver than Napoleon, and Kansas, in the domain of
legislative innovation, has a secure place in the sun.
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